

Explanation GTS Tariff Proposal 2023

February 28, 2022



Summary: proposed tariffs for 2023

- The total price is **15%** higher compared to 2022.
- Main drivers:
 - High energy prices leading to significant reconciliations;
 - The effect of declining capacity sales.

| | Total price (€/kWh/h/y) |
|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Non-storage entry | 2.609 |
| Non-storage exit | 2.644 |
| Storage entry | 1.043 |
| Storage exit | 1.058 |

* Numbers rounded on three decimals.

Note: after the presentation of the tariff proposal two changes have been made:

- The amount of reconciliations for energy costs has been increased leading to a slightly higher tariff (second decimal place adjustment). The average price change of 15% does not change;
- The figure on sheet 26 has been corrected.


Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

Regulatory framework in a nutshell



1. ACM determines expected efficient costs of GTS for the regulatory period, based on historical costs. These equal the allowed revenues (method decision and x-factor decision).
2. The tariffs are derived from the allowed revenues by dividing them by expected sales. This is arranged in the tariff decision by ACM.
3. If the realized turnover exceeds or falls below the allowed revenues, the difference is settled with the market via the subsequent tariff decision(s).

From costs... to allowed revenues...



| | |
|------------------------|-----------|
| Total length | 12,500 km |
| Compressor stations | 11 |
| N2 facility | 1 |
| N2 storage | 1 |
| Gas receiving stations | 1,300 |
| Transport | 935 TWh |

Indicative example:

| | | |
|--|--------------|---|
| 1. Return on assets (EUR 6,250 mln. x 3.0%) | EUR 185 mln. | |
| 2. Depreciation | EUR 395 mln. | |
| 3. Operational costs | EUR 220 mln. | |
| 4. Energy & Nitrogen | EUR 115 mln. | + |
| 5. Expected costs | EUR 915 mln. | |

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| Allowed revenues 2023 | EUR 911 mln. |
|-----------------------|--------------|

Current efficiency incentives

- Yearly productivity improvement (frontier shift)
- Cost benchmark to assess static efficiency

...to tariffs.

Example calculation:



| | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. Allowed revenues | 911 mln. EUR/year |
| 2. Expected sales | 435 mln. kWh/hour |
| <hr/> | |
| 3. Average tariff <i>(excluding regulatory reconciliations & corrections)</i> | 2.09 EUR/kWh/hour/year |

4. Four different tariffs in practice:

| | |
|-------------------|------------------|
| Entry non-storage | Exit non-storage |
| Entry-storage | Exit-storage |

High level of new regulatory reconciliations in tariff decisions limits possibility to forecast tariffs

- Allowed revenues form the starting point for tariff calculations
- Tariffs are calculated according to the NC-TAR decision
- For years reconciliations have been allowed for:
 - Energy and nitrogen costs for Quality Conversion
 - Administrative imbalance
 - Oversubscription and buy-back & auction premiums
 - Revenue cap regulation
- and recently also for:
 - Investment costs with a depreciation period > 10y
 - Groningen investments (Zuidbroek, G- -> H-gas industries)
 - Disinvestments and revenues from disinvestments
 - Decrease in OPEX due to disinvestments
 - Correction in the WACC for
 - the risk free rate for the calculation of cost of equity in Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
 - The interest rate for cost of debt
- Conclusion: Over 30% of GTS's cost base in the period 2022-2026 **and** 1) Groningen investments, 2) disinvestments etc. are subject to regulatory reconciliation in the tariff decisions, making a reliable tariff forecast challenging.




* Excluding regulatory reconciliations
 ** Income levels corrected for inflation (proxy: 1,7%)

Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- [Context of the tariff proposal](#)
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

Context of the Tariff proposal



Key elements of NC TAR agreement (in force until 2025)

| Key elements | NC TAR decision |
|---|--|
| Services | All-in Transmission service (no different tariffs anymore for transport, quality conversion, balancing and connection) |
| Reference price Methodology (RPM) | Postage stamp |
| Share of allowed revenue received from entry points | 40% |
| Share of allowed revenue received from exit points | 60% |
| Storage discount | 60% |
| LNG discount | 0% |
| Multiplier for daily and within-day product | 1,75 |
| Multiplier for monthly product | 1,50 |
| Multiplier for quarterly product | 1,25 |
| Seasonal factors for non yearly products | Yes |
| Interruptible capacity discount | Ex ante; discount is 0.43%* |
| Wheeling capacity discount | 94% |
| Shift of capacity on FCFS exit points | Only under strict conditions |
| Shorthaul | No longer possible |
| Backhaul | Replaced by regular firm or interruptible & entry or exit capacity |
| Diversion, ToC, ToU | Services still available, but no administrative fee anymore |


* Yearly adjusted: <https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/ontwerp-codebesluit-wijziging-korting-afschakelbare-capaciteit-1>

Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- [Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023](#)
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

FCC: 2022 versus 2023

- Total FCC decreases by 10%
- Entry capacity declines with 37 mln. kwh/h/year (-21%)
 - Storage: -43 million
 - Non storage: +6 million
- Exit capacity declines with 13 mln. kwh/h/year (-5%)
 - Storage: -2 million
 - Non storage: -11 million




Explanation differences between 2022 and 2023

- Entry non-storage
 - Increase expected of H-gas at border points;
 - Further decrease in segment production points (Groningen, Small Fields);
 - LNG remains constant.
- Entry storage
 - Some LT-contracts will end/decrease in segment storage. Significant additional bookings to existing LT-booking level are not expected.
- Exit non-storage
 - Some LT-contracts decrease in segment border points, H-gas as well as L-gas (converting small-scale consumer markets Germany, Belgium, France)
 - Decrease in segments Industry and DSO
- Exit storage
 - Some LT-contracts will end/decrease in segment storage. Additional bookings to existing LT-booking level not expected

Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- [Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023](#)
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

Determination of allowed revenue 2023



*Based on an estimated CPI of 1.7%. The final CPI will be available in April 2022 and will be applied by ACM in the tariff decision.

** See appendix 5 and 6 for a detailed overview of these corrections


Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- [Calculated Reference prices 2023](#)
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

Input parameters for Reference Price Methodology (RPM)

| Parameter | Value | Remark |
|---|--------------|--------------------------------|
| Share of allowed revenue received from entry points | 40% | NC TAR decision |
| Share of allowed revenue received from exit points | 60% | |
| Storage discount | 60% | |
| Allowed revenue | 991M € | tariff decision by ACM, yearly |
| Forecasted contracted entry capacity | 175M kwh/h/y | |
| Forecasted contracted exit capacity | 260M kwh/h/y | |
| Forecasted contracted entry Storage capacity | 66M kwh/h/y | |
| Forecasted contracted exit Storage capacity | 33M kwh/h/y | |

Reference price calculation in four steps



Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- **Calculated total prices 2023**
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- Appendix

Proposed total prices 2023 versus 2022

- Total price equals RPM + neutrality charge
- The total price is **15%** higher compared to 2022.
- The Reference price is also 15% higher in 2023 compared to 2022. Main drivers:
 - The increase in energy prices leads to a reconciliation of EUR 95 million;
 - The effect of declining capacity sales (-10%).


The neutrality charge leads to no significant change of total price. The neutrality charge equals EUR **-2.6 mln** in 2023, slightly offsetting the RPM increase.

| total price* | 2022 ² | 2023 | Delta 2023-2022 |
|----------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------------|
| Average ¹ | 1.977 | 2.272 | 15% |
| Non-storage entry | 2.175 | 2.609 | 20% |
| Non-storage exit | 2.540 | 2.644 | 4% |
| Storage entry | 0.870 | 1.043 | 20% |
| Storage exit | 1.016 | 1.058 | 4% |

* Prices in €/kWh/h/year

1. weighted average of the four prices, prices in €/kWh/h/year
2. Based on ACM Tariff Decision 2022, including Neutrality Charge

Explanation average total price increase





*Based on an estimated CPI of 1.7%. The final CPI will be available in April 2022 and will be applied by ACM in the tariff decision.

Expected revenue distribution per segment

| | (mln kWh/h/y) | revenue 2022 (M€) |
|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| Entry border points | 63 | 137 |
| Entry production points | 23 | 50 |
| Entry LNG | 18 | 39 |
| Entry storage | 109 | 95 |
| Total Entry | 213 | 321 |
| Exit border points | 84 | 213 |
| Exit industrial points | 51 | 130 |
| Exit local distribution points | 102 | 259 |
| Exit storage | 35 | 36 |
| Total Exit | 272 | 638 |
| Total Entry + Exit | 485 | 959 |

| | (mln kWh/h/y) | revenue 2023 (M€) |
|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| Entry border points | 71 | 186 |
| Entry production points | 21 | 55 |
| Entry LNG | 18 | 46 |
| Entry storage | 66 | 69 |
| Total Entry | 175 | 356 |
| Exit border points | 79 | 210 |
| Exit industrial points | 49 | 130 |
| Exit local distribution points | 98 | 260 |
| Exit storage | 33 | 35 |
| Total Exit | 260 | 635 |
| Total Entry + Exit | 435 | 991 |



Content


- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- [Reference price development 2023 and beyond](#)
- Next steps
- Appendix

FCC development 2023-2026: storage bookings and exit via border points decline sharply

Entry

FCC decreases due to:


- Declines in storage in 2023 and 2024;
- Production shows a slight decrease;
- Border points show a stable trend;
- LNG remains stable.



Exit

FCC decreases due to:

- Storage declines;
- Decrease of exit at border points;
- DSO slightly decreases;
- Industry offtake remains stable.



Tariff development 2022–2026: regulatory reconciliations do not allow for a reliable forecast

Two levers determine tariffs:

1. Allowed revenues
2. FCC


For the remaining period up to 2026:

- **Allowed revenues** decrease by 2% per year (compounded)
- **FCC** declines on average by 6% per year
 - Entry tariff increases by 3% per year
 - Exit tariff increases by 5% per year

Disclaimer:

Excluding all regulatory reconciliations; The high level of regulatory reconciliation in the new method decision substantially complicates tariff outlooks.

The tariff increase due to Zuidbroek nitrogen facility is expected to be 16% in 2024, 5% in 2025 and 5% in 2026.



Note: We assume the current RPM methodology under the NC TAR agreement.

Content

- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- [Next steps](#)
- Appendix

Next steps

Early March 2022

- GTS will send tariff proposal 2023 to ACM (1 March)
- ACM will publish GTS' proposal on ACM website
- GTS will publish this presentation on GTS website
- Market parties can send their written view to ACM within two weeks after publication on ACM website
- GTS publishes proposed neutrality charge on GTS website

Mid-end May 2022:

- ACM determines final reservation prices in tariff decision 2023 and publishes this on ACM website
- GTS publishes final neutrality charge in parallel with tariff decision
- GTS will process tariffs 2023 in GTS ICT systems
- GTS will determine entry/exit network points and publishes this in TSC at GTS website

1 Jan 2023:

- Start of 2023 tariffs

Thank you for your attention!

Content


- Regulatory framework in a nutshell
- Context of the tariff proposal
- Input for RPM: Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023
- Input for RPM: Allowed revenue 2023
- Calculated Reference prices 2023
- Calculated total prices 2023
- Reference price development 2023 and beyond
- Next steps
- [Appendix](#)

Appendix

1. How to determine Reference prices
2. How to determine reserve prices
3. Overview of proposed reserve prices
4. NC-TAR agreement: Traceability of entry and exit tariffs
5. Details of regulatory reconciliation T-2 and corrections
6. Neutrality charge for balancing

1. How to determine Reference prices

'Reference price' means the price for the yearly firm standard capacity product



1. Input parameters for RPM

| Parameter | Value | Remark |
|---|-------|-----------------------------------|
| Share of allowed revenue received from entry points | 40% | NC TAR decision |
| Share of allowed revenue received from exit points | 60% | |
| Storage discount | 60% | |
| Allowed revenue | | tariff decision by ACM, yearly |
| Forecasted contracted entry capacity | | |
| Forecasted contracted exit capacity | | |
| Forecasted contracted entry Storage capacity | | |
| Forecasted contracted exit Storage capacity | | |

Forecasted Contracted Capacity 2023

What is forecasted contracted capacity (FCC)?

- We forecast the sale of our 5 standard capacity products: within-day, day, month, quarter, year
- We translate each forecasted capacity of a non-yearly product to a capacity value of the yearly product
 - using the multiplier, the seasonal factor and the year fraction for each non-yearly product ($M * Sf * Yf$)
- The sum of all these “yearly” capacities is the ‘forecasted contracted capacity’


How do we forecast the FCC?

- We forecast the FCC per segment: Storage, Border points, Production points, LNG, Local distribution points, Industry
- Two types per segment: already contracted capacity + expected capacity sales
- Expected capacity sales are based on historical analysis and expectation from shippers, operators etc.

What if the realised capacity sales differ from the FCC?

- With an accurate forecast, shippers will pay the correct tariff for the capacity products
- Realised revenue > Allowed revenue: Shippers paid too much
- Realised revenue < Allowed revenue: Shippers paid too little
- Because of revenue cap regulation differences will be reconciliated two years later
- With an accurate forecast, regulatory reconciliation in T+2 will be minimised

1. Reference price methodology (RPM) in four steps



1. Step 1: Determine Original Reference prices


Allowed revenue,
Share of allowed revenue received from entry points,
Share of allowed revenue received from exit points,
Forecasted contracted entry capacity,
Forecasted contracted exit capacity

Step 1: Determine Original Reference prices

RPM is postage stamp methodology

- All entry points have the same original Reference price
- All exit points have the same original Reference price

Allowed revenue
(€)



Divided by


Forecasted contracted
Capacity (kWh/h)



Original Reference
price




1. Step 2: Determine original storage Reference price




1. Step 3: Determine rescale factor

Original Reference prices
Original storage Reference prices
Forecasted contracted entry storage capacity
Forecasted contracted exit storage capacity
Allowed revenue



Rescale factor

1. Step 4: Determine Reference prices



2. How to determine reserve prices

'reserve price' means the price for a **non**-yearly firm standard capacity product



3. Overview of proposed all-in reserve prices (1/4)

Non-storage Entry

| | Year | Quarter | Month | Day | Within-day |
|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| January | | | 0,59473972 | 0,02353629 | 0,00098068 |
| February | | 1,25187148 | 0,50167292 | 0,02198142 | 0,00091590 |
| March | | | 0,40215733 | 0,01591239 | 0,00066302 |
| April | | | 0,27697556 | 0,01132300 | 0,00047180 |
| May | | 0,58031951 | 0,22523476 | 0,00891545 | 0,00037148 |
| June | 2,61534287 | | 0,19346372 | 0,00791231 | 0,00032968 |
| July | | | 0,18491907 | 0,00731042 | 0,00030461 |
| August | | 0,45485470 | 0,17592301 | 0,00695932 | 0,00028998 |
| September | | | 0,18508029 | 0,00757375 | 0,00031558 |
| August | | | 0,24822470 | 0,00983082 | 0,00040962 |
| November | | 0,97480636 | 0,38918452 | 0,01591239 | 0,00066302 |
| December | | | 0,53143409 | 0,02102843 | 0,00087619 |

3. Overview of proposed all-in reserve prices (2/4)

Non-storage Exit

| | Year | Quarter | Month | Day | Within-day |
|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| January | | | 0,60288031 | 0,02385845 | 0,00099411 |
| February | | 1,26900666 | 0,50853964 | 0,02228229 | 0,00092843 |
| March | | | 0,40766192 | 0,01613019 | 0,00067210 |
| April | | | 0,2807667 | 0,01147799 | 0,00047825 |
| May | | 0,58826272 | 0,2283177 | 0,00903748 | 0,00037657 |
| June | 2,65114077 | | 0,19611178 | 0,00802061 | 0,00033420 |
| July | | | 0,18745018 | 0,00741048 | 0,00030878 |
| August | | 0,46108059 | 0,17833098 | 0,00705458 | 0,00029395 |
| September | | | 0,18761361 | 0,00767741 | 0,00031990 |
| August | | | 0,25162231 | 0,00996538 | 0,00041523 |
| November | | 0,98814917 | 0,39451154 | 0,01613019 | 0,00067210 |
| December | | | 0,53870817 | 0,02131626 | 0,00088818 |

3. Overview of proposed all-in reserve prices (3/4)

Storage Entry

| | Year | Quarter | Month | Day | Within-day |
|-----------|------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| January | | | 0,23789589 | 0,00941452 | 0,00039228 |
| February | | 0,50074859 | 0,20066917 | 0,00879257 | 0,00036636 |
| March | | | 0,16086293 | 0,00636496 | 0,00026521 |
| April | | | 0,11079022 | 0,00452920 | 0,00018872 |
| May | | 0,23212780 | 0,09009390 | 0,00356618 | 0,00014860 |
| June | | 1,04613715 | 0,07738549 | 0,00316492 | 0,00013188 |
| July | | | 0,07396763 | 0,00292417 | 0,00012185 |
| August | | 0,18194188 | 0,07036920 | 0,00278373 | 0,00011599 |
| September | | | 0,07403212 | 0,00302950 | 0,00012623 |
| August | | | 0,09928988 | 0,00393233 | 0,00016385 |
| November | | 0,38992254 | 0,15567381 | 0,00636496 | 0,00026521 |
| December | | | 0,21257364 | 0,00841137 | 0,00035048 |

3. Overview of proposed all-in reserve prices (4/4)

Storage Exit

| | Year | Quarter | Month | Day | Within-day |
|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| January | | | 0,24115212 | 0,00954338 | 0,00039765 |
| February | | 0,50760267 | 0,20341586 | 0,00891292 | 0,00037138 |
| March | | | 0,16306477 | 0,00645208 | 0,00026884 |
| April | | | 0,11230668 | 0,00459119 | 0,00019130 |
| May | | 0,23530509 | 0,09132708 | 0,00361499 | 0,00015063 |
| June | | | 0,07844471 | 0,00320824 | 0,00013368 |
| July | 1,06045631 | | 0,07498007 | 0,00296419 | 0,00012351 |
| August | | 0,18443224 | 0,07133239 | 0,00282183 | 0,00011758 |
| September | | | 0,07504544 | 0,00307097 | 0,00012796 |
| August | | | 0,10064893 | 0,00398615 | 0,00016609 |
| November | | 0,39525967 | 0,15780461 | 0,00645208 | 0,00026884 |
| December | | | 0,21548327 | 0,00852650 | 0,00035528 |

4. NC-TAR agreement: Traceability of entry and exit tariffs

| Obligation from NC TAR agreement | Remark |
|--|----------------------|
| To improve the traceability of the entry and exit tariffs, GTS will, before submitting its tariff proposal to ACM, verbally explain its proposal to market parties | this session |
| GTS explains how it has applied the Tariff Code | slide 10, 11 & 33-41 |
| GTS shows which Reference prices will be proposed | slide 2 |
| GTS makes a comparison with the prices for the previous year | slide 21 |
| GTS explains how she determines the proposed forecasted contracted capacity | slide 13, 14 |
| GTS explains which regulatory reconciliation and corrections it wishes to propose | slide 47 |
| GTS shows the distribution of revenues per segment, whereby at least a distinction is made between interconnection points, production points, storages, LNG, local distribution points and industry and between entry and exit | slide 23 |
| GTS will publish the oral explanation (this presentation) on its website | March 2022 |

5. Details of regulatory reconciliation T-2 and corrections

| regulatory reconciliation and corrections | Total € mln. | Link to Method Decision 2017-2021 |
|---|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Purchase costs energy (only QC) | 95 | Chapter 9.2.1 |
| Revenue-cap regulation | -1 | Chapter 9.3 |
| Administrative imbalance | 23 | Chapter 9.2.4 |
| Over subscription and buy back | -7 | Chapter 9.4.3 |
| Auction premium | -1 | Chapter 9.4.2 |
| Other corrections | 0 | |
| TOTAL (rounded) | 109 | |

| regulatory reconciliation and corrections | Total € mln. | Link to Method Decision 2022-2026 |
|---|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Investment costs with a depreciation period > 10y | -27 | Chapter 8.3.6 |
| Decrease in OPEX due to disinvestments | -1 | Chapter 7.3.3 |
| Other corrections | 0 | |
| TOTAL (rounded) | -28 | |

6. Neutrality charge for Balancing

- The neutrality charge for balancing activities is an NC BAL obligation
- NC BAL states that a TSO shall not gain or lose by the payment and receipt of any of its balancing activities (article 29)
- A code change was implemented by ACM in 2020 in order to approve the methodology for the calculation of the neutrality charges for balancing activities
- The charge consists of the Linepack Flexibility Service fee (regular) and incidental balancing costs (like defaults)
- The methodology for the calculation of the neutrality charges for balancing activities is equal to the calculation method for the Reference price and the reserve prices for transmission services as set out in the NC TAR decision by ACM
- As a consequence, each capacity product (except wheeling) will have a tariff set by ACM and a neutrality charge determined by GTS
- For 2023 the neutrality charge amounts to approximately EUR -2,6 mln.

Neutrality charge calculation (using RPM method)

